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Abstract
Recent years have seen an upsurge of inflammatory speech around the 
world. Understanding the mechanisms that correlate speech with violence is 
a necessary step to explore the most effective forms of counterspeech. This 
paper starts with a review of the features of dangerous speech and ideology, as 
formulated by Jonathan Maynard and Susan Benesch. It then offers a conceptual 
framework to analyze some of the underlying linguistic mechanisms at play: 
derogatory language, code words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. It gives 
a hypothesis for assessing the moral responsibility of interlocutors in dangerous 
speech situations. The last section applies this framework to the case of 
demagogic discourse by Catalan nationalists. The framework offered explains 
how public discourse in Catalonia has harmed social relations and institutions, 
and is an obstacle to rational resolutions to the political situation.
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Resumen
En los últimos años se ha producido un recrudecimiento de los discursos 
incendiarios en todo el mundo. Comprender los mecanismos que correlacionan 
el discurso con la violencia es un paso necesario para explorar las formas más 
efectivas de contralocución. Este documento comienza con una revisión de las 
principales características de los discursos ideológicos peligrosos, formulado 
por Jonathan Maynard y Susan Benesch. Se ofrece además un marco conceptual 
con el que analizar algunos de los mecanismos lingüísticos subyacentes en 
juego, lenguaje despectivo, silbidos de perro, las llamadas ‘hojas de parra’ o 
perversiones de significado y una hipótesis para evaluar la responsabilidad 
moral de los interlocutores en situaciones de habla peligrosa. El último apartado 
explica desde este marco conceptual el discurso demagógico de los políticos 
nacionalistas catalanes, poniendo de manifiesto cómo el discurso público en 
Cataluña ha tenido ha tenido un impacto negativo en las relaciones sociales y 
en las instituciones, y es un obstáculo para la resolución racional de la situación 
política.
Palabras-clave: Discurso peligroso, silbidos de perro, calumnias, hojas 
de parra, perversiones de significado, actualización de contexto, Cataluña.
1. What is Dangerous Speech?
Philosophers have written on hate speech3, but not much on how and when 
discourse correlates with actual violent action. Maynard and Benesch offer an 
account that helps to fill that gap. They describe dangerous speech as speech 
that is capable of encouraging approval of violence by an audience: “The forms 
of speech and ideology that catalyze mass violence, and the ways in which they 
do so, are strikingly similar across different cases” (Maynard & Benesch 2016: 
71). Dangerous speech is inflammatory speech that is motivational. Grasping 
the identifying features of dangerous speech offers tools for monitoring and 
preventing mass violence. Benesch leads the Dangerous Speech Project, whose 
guidelines have been put to use in various countries, for instance in Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Sudan, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Czech 
Republic. 
Benesch (2012) distinguishes between directly and indirectly harmful 
speech. In this paper, I offer complementary resources to understand this 
distinction. In the second section, I describe directly harmful speech as 
language use that is conventionally or constitutively harmful, using denigrating 
and derogating language. I characterize indirectly harmful speech as that 
3  See for instance Maitra and McGowan (2012).
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which exploits other pragmatic means of communication, like code words, 
racial figleaves, or meaning perversions. I will offer a view about the effects of 
harmful speech on conversational contexts, and a hypothesis about audiences’ 
moral responsibility for allowing such context updates. In the last section, the 
paper applies this theoretical framework to the case of secessionist discourse 
in Catalonia, showing that it meets the conditions for dangerous speech (‘DS’ 
henceforth), with examples of directly and of indirectly harmful discourse. 
This, I conclude, warrants monitoring and prevention strategies.
An explanation before I proceed. Friends tell me that there’s DS in Spain, 
too. It is undeniable that there’s inflammatory speech in Spain. But I think this 
is a version of the “both sides” fallacy, problematically presupposing that the 
political crisis is one of Spain (as a whole) against Catalonia (as a whole), 
ignoring the risks of the division within Catalan society. Other times, the 
comment assumes that there is at least as much of a significant accommodation 
of inflammatory speech in Spain as there is in Catalonia. I don’t know if that’s the 
case. Either way, others might of course try to establish that my considerations 
apply on equal terms to acts by opponents of secession, in particular among 
movements on the far-right. I invite anyone so interested to do so with the tools 
presented here. I’m convinced we should be clear-eyed and look at all possible 
sources of conflict, and take myself to be doing my part towards this end.
Friends also say that most secessionists in Catalonia are not xenophobes 
and dislike hate speech. I think this is true. The majority of secessionists 
are normal middle or upper-middle-class people who declare support for 
democracy (Llaneras 2017). As the politician Ernest Maragall has said in an 
interview to BBC’s Hard Talk, “we are more European”4. Regrettably, we must 
distinguish the accommodation of DS in the public record, i.e., speech that is 
taken for granted by a large group, and the individual acceptance of the various 
dimensions of its content (I address this in the next section). 
The remainder of this section summarizes Maynard and Benesch’s criteria 
for diagnosing DS. They identify three features of the contexts of DS: the 
speaker, the audience in its sociohistorical environment, and the availability 
of means of dissemination. (Maynard & Benesch 2016: 77). The speaker is 
someone who is powerful, popular, or charismatic. Although audiences are not 
homogenous, and certain members may be more susceptible5, anyone can come 
to condone violence. DS often occurs in sociohistorical contexts that increase 
the likelihood that the audience condones violence. The final element of the 
context of DS is the medium of dissemination. If a community relies mainly on 
one source of news, the message spread is more influential. For instance, the 
station RTLM was the main source of the inflammatory messages in Rwanda. In 
4  https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3ct4f88
5  Young men are more likely to engage in violent action. (Maynard & Benesch 2016: 78)
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a statistical study, Yanagizawa-Drott established a correlation between speech 
and violence, showing that killings were 65-77% higher in Rwandan villages 
that received the RTLM signal, compared with those that did not (Yanagizawa-
Drott 2014).
Social media has played a major role in the dissemination of disinformation 
and inflammatory speech in recent years. In an article in the Pew Report of 
September 2017, it’s reported that 67% of Americans said that they get at least 
some of their news on social media (Shearer and Gottfried 2017), and reports 
about Cambridge Analytica’s exploitation of Facebook users’ data to influence 
elections during the Brexit referendum vote and the 2016 US presidential 
election are worrying6. Facebook use in Germany has been showed to have 
fueled anti-refugee attacks (Müller & Schwartz 2018).
Interestingly, Maynard and Benesch say that in some cases language creates 
the relevant social and historical context, where a word used as a dogwhistle 
(of which I’ll say more in the next section) can play this role by taking on a 
“fearsome meaning”, for instance “to eat” and “to wash” (used in Rwanda before 
the 1994 genocide). The choice of language itself can be a form of dissemination: 
…the same message communicated in the “mother tongue” of an ethnic group 
can have more force than if it were delivered in a language shared by other 
groups, since this reinforces the sense of solidarity within the group, and may 
encourage a feeling of impunity given the presumption that one will only be 
understood by co-linguals. (Maynard & Benesch 2016: 79)
 
They claim that the two necessary conditions for DS are the inflammatory 
speech act itself, and a susceptible audience. 
The authors then characterize the six features of the content of DS. The 
first is dehumanization through forms of discourse that can harm directly by the 
offense, denigration, or derogation of members of a target group. This diminishes 
or denies the target group “their humanity, reducing the moral significance of their 
future deaths, or the duties owed to them by potential perpetrators” (Maynard and 
Benesch 2016: 80). The next section gives a summary of my preferred account of 
derogatory language, how it harms, and interlocutors’ responsibility for it. 
There are also forms of speech that can harm indirectly. Speech can silence 
or disable the target group’s participation in democratic processes, promote 
deceitful ideology, or subvert democratic deliberation, normalizing racism 
and bigotry while reassuring and giving cover to those who don’t want to see 
themselves as racists. Indirectly harmful speech is more likely to be used by 
demagogues, since it allows them to bypass explicit resistance to it. 
6  See the Cambridge Analytica files in The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/
cambridge-analytica-files
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The remaining features of DS are guilt attribution, threat construction, 
destruction of alternatives, virtue-talk and future bias. To accept that an out-
group is guilty or presents a threat, to be convinced that self-preservation of 
an in-group requires taking drastic steps, and to accept promises that those 
drastic steps will bring about desired outcomes, are attitudes that exploit 
moral emotions and moralized reasoning. My hypothesis about the crucial 
mechanism underlying harmful speech capable of motivating regular people to 
condone acts of violence is that it deploys and exploits some of the fundamental 
functional roles of moral discourse:
(a) That moral talk expresses affective and action-guiding, motiva-
tional, attitudes;
(b) That moral talk builds a connection among the people who accept 
it; and 
(c) That updating a conversational context with a moral claim predis-
poses interlocutors to do their part in future actions by giving them 
reasons to act.
The next section offers a framework to account for the direct and indirect 
forms of speech.
2. How does speech do direct and indirect harm?
How is it that normalizing DS compromises people to future courses of 
action? Timothy Snyder hints:
A shop marked “Jewish” had no future. It became an object of covetous 
plans. As property was marked as ethnic, envy transformed ethics... Thus, the 
Germans who marked shops as “Jewish” participated in the process by which 
Jews really did disappear – as did people who simply looked on. Accepting the 
markings as a natural part of the urban landscape was already a compromise 
with a murderous future. (Snyder 2017: 34-35)
Speech can harm directly through insult, derogation, and denigration. And 
it can harm indirectly by undermining social and moral norms in surreptitious 
ways. Understanding the power of speech is hence necessary for the protection 
of liberal democracy, which relies on the reasonable and argued defense of 
divergent views. To counteract the harms of dangerous speech requires 
understanding the mechanisms at work. 
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I characterize directly harmful speech as speech that is constitutively 
harmful. How can speech be constitutively harmful? Speech can be directly 
harmful through its illocutionary force. The notion was developed by Austin 
(1973). The illocutionary force of an utterance is the action that is constituted by 
that utterance. If one says to her child, “I’m very sorry we didn’t get tickets for 
the concert”, the utterance has the illocutionary force of an apology. Utterances 
have different illocutionary forces: declaratives or constatives describe the 
world, orders or requests direct action. McGowan (2009) offered a view of 
oppressive speech that is directly harmful. As she put it, oppressive speech acts 
are exercitive acts that enact permissibility facts that oppress7.
Theories of derogatory language seek to explain facts about the effects 
of its use. In joint work with García-Carpintero, we argue that pejoratives and 
slurs conventionally carry expressive presuppositions (Marques & García-
Carpintero 2019)8. We explain this expressive meaning on a normative view 
of presuppositions and of the context relative to which speech acts make their 
contributions. Our view explains why derogatory language insults, and why it 
is so difficult to articulate its derogatory content. 
Stalnaker (2014) regards conversational contexts as “a body of information 
that is available, or presumed to be available, as a resource for communication”. 
Assertions that are accepted in a conversation add the propositions to which 
speakers are committed to the context set as beliefs. But, we argue, people are 
not only committed to shared beliefs, they are also committed to the questions 
that direct their inquiry, to the directives that structure their plans for action, and 
to other evaluative dispositions, emotions, and “reactive attitudes” (Strawson 
1974/2008)9. The different types of shared commitments that structure and 
update conversational contexts, we hold, are constituted by their respective 
illocutionary modes: constative, directive, expressive. Slurs and pejoratives, 
which are expressives, make requirements on the conative record, and are 
governed by the sui generis constitutive norms that are specific to the expressed 
emotions (contempt, disgust, anger) and their acceptability. 
Now, intentions, emotions, and evaluative dispositions form what Williams 
(1981) called a motivational set, the set of attitudes that explain why people act 
as they do. In our proposed modification of Stalnakerian contexts, a shared 
motivational set is part of context broadly understood. Collective emotions can 
function as both motivating and justifying reasons for joint action, sometimes 
7  Langton (1993) had already used speech act theory to make sense of MacKinnon’s (1987) claim 
that pornography (understood as speech) constitutes harm.
8  Other authors defending expressive, or expressive presuppositional, views include Cepollaro & 
Stojanovic (2016) and Jeshion (2013a, 2013b, 2016).
9  Reactive attitudes are moral attitudes we have towards other agents qua persons in response to 
how they act. These are attitudes like resentment, contempt, disgust, or anger which contribute to 
structure our interpersonal relations.
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even without prior joint intentions of the participants10. Thus, the people who 
accept to update conversational contexts with derogation normalize negative 
reactive attitudes against its targets, a normalization that provides both 
permission and motivation to act against them by canceling some of the duties 
owed to them qua persons.
To illustrate: two common slurs in Catalonia are ‘charnego’ and ‘botifler’. 
‘Charnego’ denotes migrants from other Spanish regions (historically poorer 
regions like Andalusia, Murcia, or Castilla-la-Mancha). Its etymology may 
have its origin in the Spanish ‘luchaniego’, meaning mongrel, anyone of 
mixed race, or a non-assimilated foreigner. ‘Botifler’ denotes people with 
Catalan ancestry who oppose secession, and is associated with traitors. The 
expressive presupposition associated with ‘charnego’, for instance, concerns 
the contextual record of kinds worthy of contempt, to the effect that it includes 
Spaniards in Catalonia with ancestry from other Spanish regions, on account of 
their ancestry and habits11. Accepting a literal use of ‘charnego’ leads to taking 
for granted the acceptability of contempt for Spaniards without a Catalan 
background12. 
How do we assess the moral responsibility of interlocutors who 
accommodate derogatory language? Kutz’s (2000) account of collective action 
explains cases where participants in a group act need not all have an executive 
perspective on the goal of the action. On Kutz’s account, in a collective action 
G, individuals have overlapping participatory intentions to do their part in the 
action. Often participants have no views or intentions concerning what should 
be done collectively, but participate in actions in hierarchical contexts where 
they do not make decisions, and they can contribute to do their part in actions 
whose ends they disavow. This can help explain how people can share in the 
responsibility for the outcome of actions even if not everyone in the audience 
actually forms the individual executive intention to bring about the aim of the 
action.
The combination of Kutz’s account with the view of derogatory speech 
sketched above provides a framework for assessing ways speech can be harmful 
by leading an audience to take for granted attitudes like resentment, contempt, 
anger, and disgust. It also serves to assess the moral responsibility of audiences 
who accommodate harmful speech. Since these are motivating attitudes, to 
accept inflammatory claims is to accept to do one’s part towards a collective 
action (doing one’s part may be simply to condone or give cover to future 
10  Salmela and Nagatsu (2016) give an account of collective emotions that links the intentional 
structure of joint actions and their underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. See also Salmela 
& von Scheve (2017).
11  For a historical view on urban pressure in Barcelona after migration from regions like Murcia, 
see Marín (2018).
12  This is close to McGowan’s (2004, 2009) view that speech alters context by enacting what is 
permissible. See also Ayala and Vasilyeva (2016).
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violent actions). This captures normative features of the use of derogatory 
language. To tolerate or condone derogatory language is to condone the actions 
it motivates.
In the previous section I raised the issue of how we assess the moral 
responsibility of a population where many disapprove of xenophobia and hate 
speech. We can now address this worry. The fact that individuals in a population 
declare disapproval of violent acts, or lack criminal intentions, is insufficient 
to assess their responsibility in joint acts. It is unsatisfactory to say that not 
everyone in a population who agree to do their part in an act have problematic 
beliefs or intentions. If they were not coerced, and if they accepted enough 
problematic motivating and justifying emotions to accept doing their part in the 
action, they share in the responsibility for the outcomes. 
I move now to examine how speech can also bring about harm indirectly, 
by uses of language that is not constitutively harmful, but that motivates 
harmful actions. I will describe three mechanisms that harm indirectly: code 
words (or dogwhistles), figleaves, and meaning perversions. 
In 2001, Mendelberg examined how and when politicians routinely evoke 
racial stereotypes and resentment without voters’ awareness, while plausibly 
denying doing so. The U.S. Republican presidential campaign of Bush against 
Dukakis had used code words to animate racist feelings motivated by fears of 
black people, but without explicitly contradicting the (presumably) shared norm 
of racial equality that racism is bad. By using code words, campaigners could 
violate that norm with plausible deniability. Voters who explicitly condemned 
racism could act on the basis of high levels of racial resentment without feeling 
any psychological tension. Stanley (2015) argues that code words erode not 
only norms of equality, but also norms of reasonableness of public discourse, 
thereby subverting democratic deliberation. Speakers may publicly come to 
allow democratically illegitimate reasons for adopting a parochial policy into 
the public discussion (Stanley 2015: 129). 
Code words can be overt or covert. Overt code words, or dogwhistles, are 
designed with intent to allow two plausible interpretations: a private content 
aimed at the desired target audience, and a plausible non-racist content aimed 
at a broader audience. Additionally, as Saul (Saul 2017: 122) argues, covert 
dogwhistles effectively activate racial attitudes in people who condemn racism 
by bypassing conscious awareness. Explicit racial appeals are less effective 
because they trigger self-monitoring. This makes covert code words especially 
fitting in the preservation of a positive self-image. 
The speaker who uses a code word takes advantage of a common ground 
of information, of shared attitudes like resentment, and exploits conversational 
cooperative principles like relevance (Grice 1975). To illustrate, Trump said in 
2011.
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If we keep on this path, if we reelect Barack Obama, the America we leave 
our kids and grandkids won’t look like the America we were blessed to grow 
up in. The American Dream will be in hock. The shining city on the hill will 
start to look like an inner-city wreck. (Trump 2011, Time to Get Tough: Making 
America # 1 Again, quoted in Khoo 2017)
What is the relevance of bringing up city centers, where the majority of 
the population is black, while arguing and advising against reelecting the first 
black president? By mentioning Obama and inner-cities in the same breath, 
Trump invites the audience to see a relevant connection between the two, a 
connection based on the salience of skin color and the racial resentment the 
audience presumably shares.
Speech can erode social norms in other ways. Saul (2017) introduces the 
notion of racial figleaves, which describes an utterance made in addition to 
another openly racist one, providing cover for the offensive content. Figleaves 
also allow people to accept openly racist speech while preserving the self-
assurance that they’re not racist. A prime example is Trump’s speech at the 
launch of the 2015 campaign: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not 
sending you... They’re sending people that have lots of problems… They’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, 
are good people. (reported in Philips 2017)
The last sentence is the figleaf. Notice that it also allows plausible 
deniability – “I didn’t mean that they all are”.
Finally, we have what I call meaning perversions (Marques 2019). These 
include phrases like “free election” as used in the former USSR. As Gessen 
(2017) says, “There was nothing free about it, it did not constitute expression, 
it had no relationship to citizenship or will because it granted the subject 
no agency.” Now, meaning perversions carry with them positive or negative 
connotations, while being grossly misapplied to things that do not merit that 
valuation. This renders criticism of the misapplication nearly impossible, 
inviting the rhetorical reply, “how can you be against free elections?” The 
question seems to enforce shared social or moral values, and makes it difficult 
for socially conforming individuals to resist. The perversion is that this form 
of speech undermines and erodes the shared norm in its misapplication – 
the Soviet ritual isn’t an actual election. To regard unsuitable referents as 
deserving of the treatment that the compliance with the shared norm requires 
is perverted:
 
Calling this ritual either an “election” or the “free expression of citizen will” had 
a dual effect: it eviscerated the words “election,” “free,” “expression,” “citizen,” 
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and “will,” and it also left the thing itself undescribed. When something cannot 
be described, it does not become a fact of shared reality (Gessen 2017)
The indirect harmful forms of speech achieve through non-constitutive 
means what derogatory language can achieve directly: to make problematic 
beliefs, plans, and reactive attitudes common ground. Both direct and indirect 
forms allow the normalization of problematic attitudes that are incompatible 
with preexisting democratic norms. We can’t take for granted non-discriminatory 
egalitarian norms, or the protections of the rights of all, while taking also for 
granted that resentment, contempt, anger, or disgust can motivate and justify 
the denial of the rights of some. 
The next section takes Catalan secessionist demagoguery as a case study 
for directly and indirectly harmful DS.
3. Dangerous Speech in Catalonia
In a 2017 interview, the historian John H. Elliot comments on the current 
sociohistorical context in Catalonia, and suggests some of the conditions that 
contributed to it:
With their devolved powers, throughout the 1980s, under (longtime premier) 
Jordi Pujol, generations have been exposed [in public education] to a falsified 
version of history, a manipulation with nationalist tendencies. They have 
deliberately concealed the parts where it would have been fair to talk about the 
progress that’s been achieved. (interview with Ruiz Mantilla 2017)
Elliot is pointing to a sociohistorical context – a past history of conflicts – 
that Pujol’s governments exploited to feed anti-Spanish grievances and keep his 
party in power13. It’s not the task of this paper to offer historical analyses. But 
the examples offered below to illustrate direct and indirect harmful speech, and 
the various types of dangerous contents, are consistent with Elliot’s statement.
3.1 Context 
The elements of the context of DS, according to Maynard and Benesch, 
are influential speakers that exploit a sociohistorical context of resentment or 
grievances, the media, and an audience susceptible of accepting inflammatory 
speech. The Catalan case offers an illustration.
13  Pujol was leader of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC, 1974-2003), and Catalan 
president from 1980 until 2003.
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Elected politicians have taken advantage of historical resentment to gain 
political capital, and it is not hard to find instances of ethnicist or racist claims 
made by presidents of the Generalitat – the Catalan government – (with the 
exception of the socialist José Montilla). Pujol wrote in 1958: 
The Andalusian man is not a coherent man, he is an anarchic man, he is a man 
who is destroyed [...] who lives in a state of ignorance and of cultural, mental 
and spiritual misery […] from the outset he constitutes the sample of the lowest 
social and spiritual value in Spain… if by force of the number he were able 
to dominate, without having overcome his own perplexity, he would destroy 
Catalonia...14
In a text from 1966, Pujol had also referred to migrants as “an army of 
occupation” (Benitez 2018). Pujol later apologized (Pujol 1977). In 2010, Artur 
Mas became CDC’s leader and Catalan president. In the 2012 elections, his 
slogan was La Voluntat d’un Poble (“the will of a people”). Campaign posters 
showed him with open arms, like Moses against a sea of people and flags. In 
an interview, he said:
Perhaps the Catalan cultural DNA is mixed with our long membership in the 
Franco-Germanic world. In short, Catalonia, twelve centuries ago, belonged 
to the Hispanic March and its capital was Aachen, the heart of the empire of 
Charlemagne. Something must remain in our DNA, because the Catalans have 
an umbilical cord that makes us more Germanic and less Roman. (interview 
with Rahola, 2012) (my emphasis)
Mas is here animating racist nationalist feelings. But such racial 
essentialism occurs in other political quadrants. Oriol Junqueras, leader of ERC 
(Catalan republican left) wrote in 2008:
In particular, the Catalans have more genetic proximity with the French than 
with the Spaniards; more with the Italians than with the Portuguese; and a bit 
with Swiss. While the Spaniards are closer to the Portuguese than the Catalans 
and very little to the French. Curious... (Junqueras 2008) (my emphasis)
In 2001, Enric Vila published a book on the thought of Heribert Barrera, a 
historical figure of the ERC, who was secretary general of ERC (1976 –1983), 
president of the Catalan parliament (1980 –1984), and an MP in the European 
Parliament (1990 – 1994). The book attracted attention because of its racism 
and bigotry. Barrera’s quotes included: 
14  Republished in Pujol, 1976: pp. 65-68. I translated all quotes from articles in Catalan and 
Spanish.
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“In America, blacks have a lower intelligent coefficient than whites”, 
“The mentally weak of genetic origin should be sterilized”, 
An apology of the claims of the Austrian far-right leader Jörg Haider “when 
he says that there are too many foreigners in Austria he’s not making a racist 
proclamation.”
Other politicians like Josep Manel Ximenis, former mayor of Arenys 
de Munt with the far-left party CUP (who resigned after charges of 
misappropriation of public funds), said in an interview that the Civil War was 
a war of Spain against Catalonia. This is not true. Records of victims in mass 
graves are registered on databases that show the much higher number of victims 
of Franco’s troops in mass graves in Andalusia, Aragon, or Madrid15. Ximenis 
also repeats essentialist tropes: 
I think that the Castilian character has not changed, and that it has nothing to do 
with the Catalan character. In Catalonia, society is diametrically opposed to the 
feudal Castilian society… Castile can be summarized in a simple hierarchy of 
farmers and aristocracy. The Castilian mentality carries in its genes to naturally 
accept: ‘submit to orders’16.
Other expressions of Catalan superiority are easy to find. Jordi Cabré, 
advisor for the Catalan Justice Department, titled an opinion article with a 
simple “We’re better” (Cabré 2015). As these quotes indicate, influential 
speakers in Catalonia have exacerbated longstanding grievances, resentment, 
racial essentialism, and misrepresented historical conflicts for political gains, 
contributing to a context of dangerous speech. 
The second element of the context of DS is the media, to which Sandrine 
Morel, correspondent for Le Monde, dedicates a chapter of her 2018 book:
It’s June 2017 and the situation is becoming more and more tense. We’re 
having a casual conversation [with a communication director of PDeCat]17 
about the upcoming referendum on October 1st. I express my doubts about its 
legitimacy, about the guarantees that can be offered in the case of a consultation 
held unilaterally, about the consequences that defying the Spanish government 
may entail. And he utters a sentence that deeply shocks me: “If we buy two 
advertising pages in Le Monde, you will write what you’re told by your 
bosses […]” Upon noticing my anger, he admits, embarrassed: “Well, that’s 
the way things work here”. This confession is very revealing: it proves the 
Generalitat is used to controlling the editorial line in private media through 
subsidies, institutional advertising or appointments; and that the same happens 
15  https://desmemoria.eldiario.es/mapa-fosas/
16  https://politica.e-noticies.es/la-guerra-del-36-es-una-guerra-contra-los-catalanes-94074.html
17  The secessionist PDeCAT – Catalan European Democratic Party – was founded in 2016 as a 
successor of the former CDC, which was being investigated for corruption.
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with public media, where secessionists have placed supporters or outright pro-
independence militants. The power of the Generalitat over the media is not a 
secret, but in Catalonia no one seems to find it shocking […] After watching 
public Catalan TV for hours and checking its ideological bias on its news 
broadcasts and talk shows, on the selection of their guests and the subjects […] 
in October I interview [in TV3] its director, Vicent Sanchis, an elated man, 
always with an ironic smile on his face […] He believes that, if there is criticism 
against TV3, it’s due to the fact that public TV is, with the police and the school, 
one of the “three main pillars of a State”. (Morel 2018; quoted from the English 
translation available at https://voicesfromspain.com/2018/08/07/inside-the-
catalan-hurricane-part-ii-the-media/)
“Ideological bias”, as Morel says, and derogation of Spaniards, are 
common in the public media. A former director of the public Catalan TV3, Joan 
Oliver, said on Catalan public radio RAC1, in a debate with Oriol Junqueras 
(leader of ERC), “Spaniards are Spaniards and are chorizos [a slur for thieves], 
in virtue of being Spaniards”. Junqueras didn’t interrupt or object to Oliver’s 
statement18. Under the assumption that the account of derogatory language 
introduced in the previous section is correct, this interaction between Oliver 
and Junqueras shows that the proposition that Spaniards are thieves and worthy 
of contempt because of it is taken as common ground, as is the associated 
contempt for Spaniards.
In spite of the proclaimed antagonism between the Spanish and the 
Catalan identities, Catalan politicians are not less prone to corruption than the 
Spanish. This corruption is sometimes connected with secessionist propaganda 
efforts. For instance, Barcelona’s Disputació (provincial council) was involved 
in a scandal in 2018, when the CATmón Foundation, presided then by Victor 
Tarradelles, was the target of a police operation, which investigated a plot of 
corruption in connection with the use of public subsidies distributed without a 
proper public contest between 2012-2015 (Pardo Torregrosa 2018, Cañizares 
2018). Around thirty people were arrested and records were searched in 
buildings of CATMón, the Diputació, and other government offices. Among 
the recipients of the subsidies were publications like the magazine Catalan 
International View.
In 2018, the national and international press informed of a US report by 
congressional Democrats that said that there was “evidence that Kremlin-run 
news outlets like RT and Sputnik, reinforced by bots and fake social media 
accounts, carried out a disinformation campaign” leading to the independence 
referendum (Noack 2018, Alonzo 2018)19. Disinformation also exaggerated 
reports of police violence on the day of the referendum. The Guardian and the 
18  On the stealing trope, Olivas (2013) summarizes the economic relations between Spain and 
Catalonia when the slogans “Spain steals from us!” were popularized. 
19  The full report is available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf
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BBC acknowledged that there was little checking of the veracity of the images 
of police violence (Preston 2017)20. Together, Morel’s description of the media, 
the US congressional report, and the investigation into the misuse of public 
funds to subsidize pro-independence publications, paint a bleak picture of the 
role of the media in shaping public opinion.
The third feature of DS is the susceptible audience. The description of the 
events of September 2017 can help us understand the secessionist audience. 
José Luís Martí (2017) describes what he calls the constitutional coup d’état 
that took place in the Catalan parliament in September 2017, when Parliament 
passed the “Self-determination Referendum” and the “Legal Transition” 
acts. These bills were only set on the agenda on the morning of the 6th, and 
were approved with narrow majorities. Most of the opposition abandoned 
the chamber in protest, claiming that the bills were unconstitutional. The 
secessionists didn’t do a consultative judicial review of unconstitutionality 
before the Court of Statutory Guarantees. Independent legal advisors warned 
that the decisions were unconstitutional, and violated the procedural rules of 
the Parliament. Left-wing journalist and author Antonio Santamaría considers 
that the events are indicative of authoritarianism: 
This authoritarian character of the presidency of the Generalitat was evidenced 
in the so-called legal transition law, approved on September 7, 2017 and 
suspended by the Constitutional Court, where the president of the Generalitat 
would have the power to elect the members of the Supreme Court of the Catalan 
Republic and to issue bills that could not be appealed before any judicial 
instance. This would entail the end of the liberal democratic separation of 
powers and a conferral to the president of almost dictatorial power. For that 
reason, it is paradoxical that pro-independence media criticizes the low quality 
of Spanish democracy and claims that the Catalan Republic would have been a 
more advanced democracy. Moreover, in the draft-Constitution prepared by the 
former judge Santi Vidal, the illegalization of parties opposed to independence 
and to the Catalan Constitution was contemplated, significantly restricting 
political pluralism in contrast to the Spanish State, where the opposition to the 
Spanish Constitution is not a motive for outlawing parties. (Santamaría 2019)
And yet, around 40% of the population supported the disobedience 
promoted by the elected officials who controlled the parliament and the 
government. This indicated the division in Catalan society:
On the diada on September 11 2017 (…), between 500,000 and 1 million 
people peacefully marched through the city center of Barcelona advocating 
the secession and celebrating the referendum. They supported the acts of 
disobedience already performed and those announced for the future by the 
20  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-41703119
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Catalan Government and Parliament, as well as by many Catalan mayors... 
These protesters can be said to represent the 1.8 or 1.9 million Catalans who 
are presumably in favour of secession. But they constitute less than 40% of 
the electorate; many among the other 60% of voters in Catalonia follow these 
events with great concern. (Martí 2017) (My emphasis).
The elected representatives of the majority were ignored. Puidgemont, 
then president, justified the constitutional coup d’état saying,
We will not let ourselves be robbed of our hopes and dreams just so that 
everyone can give an opinion21.
The tally of votes from the illegal referendum of October 1st had the 
participation of only 43% of eligible voters, of which 92% voted for secession.22 
Most Catalan voters abstained. This was an act promoted by the representatives 
of a large minority who disregarded the legitimate democratic representation 
of a majority of citizens in Catalonia who oppose secession; this may still have 
social and political repercussions.
3.2. Content
The features that Maynard and Benesch (2016) identify as characteristic of the 
content of DS are dehumanization, guilt-attribution, threat construction, virtue-
talk, destruction of alternatives, and future-bias. We’ve seen some of these in the 
quotes above, but I will illustrate them with more detail in this section.
3.2.1. Dehumanization, derogation and denigration
Dehumanization through speech is achieved with language that is directly 
harmful. It can involve slurs and pejoratives, names of animals that induce fear 
or disgust (‘beasts’, ‘snakes’, ‘dogs’, ‘parasites’, ‘cockroaches’, or ‘vermin’), 
names for diseases or contaminants (‘cancer’, ‘toxin’, ‘microbes’), names 
of inanimate objects (‘logs’) or for supernatural entities (‘devils’). It’s not 
hard to find examples of directly harmful speech in Catalonia. The socialist 
Miquel Iceta and the musician Joan Manuel Serrat are often called traitors and 
‘botiflers’ (Bono 2017). “Puta Espanya” is commonly hurled at Spain (I had it 
sprayed next to my office for over a year).
Popular actors in the public Catalan TV3, like Toni Albá or Jair Dominguez 
regularly insult Spaniards. Dominguez said in a tweet from March 7 2019, “I 
21  From the live coverage of the debate in parliament in La Vanguardia, at 16:41
http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170907/431084924979/referendum-1-o-en-directo.html, 
22  https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/26/why-the-referendum-on-
catalan-independence-is-illegal
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love these accounts of snitcher bots… They are the best of the unionist leper”23. 
During the electoral campaign for the Catalan government and parliament of 
2017, then leader of Ciutadans/Cs in the region, Inés Arrimadas24, whose family 
is from Andalusia, was told by the former president of the regional parliament, 
Nuria de Gisbert, “Why don’t you go back to Cádiz?”25 More recently, after 
a 2019 campaign event of Cs in Puidgemont’s hometown, locals gathered to 
“disinfect” the public square26. Uses of names for contaminants or diseases are 
dehumanizing metaphors. Through them, speakers can make expressive speech 
acts that elicit anger, disgust and contempt, giving motivation and justification 
for cleaning or disinfection. This specific combination of emotions constitutes 
the so-called ‘ANCODI’ model that explains the role emotions play in violence 
(Matsumoto et al 2015). 
The 2017 elections gave over 25% of the vote to Cs, ahead of Puidgemont’s 
party (21%). Quim Torra had been a contributor of opinion articles in the media, 
for instance an op-ed plagued with dehumanizing terms, a fact which did not 
deter left-wing ERC and CUP from supporting Puidgemont’s party to form 
government, allowing Torra to become president (as Puidgemont had escaped 
to Belgium to evade criminal charges). Torra wrote in 2008, for instance
Now we take a look at your country and we see the beasts once again… Snakes, 
vipers, hyenas. Beasts in human form, however, glistening hate. An outraged 
hatred, nauseating, like dentures with green mold, against everything that 
language represents. They are here, among us. They repudiate any expression 
of Catalanity. It’s a sickly phobia... Or a small error in their DNA chain. Poor 
individuals! They live in a country of which they know nothing: its culture, its 
traditions, its history. They are insulated from anything that represents Catalan 
feats. It gives them urticaria. They repel everything that is not Spanish and in 
Spanish. They have their names and their surnames, the beasts. We all know 
one. They abound, the beasts. They live, they die and they multiply. (Torra 
2018a)
The dehumanizing terms elicit fear (‘vipers’, ‘snakes’, ‘hyenas’), disgust 
(‘dentures with green mold’), contempt (‘beasts in human form’, ‘small error in 
their DNA chain’) and anger (‘they repel everything that is not Spanish’). But 
the article continued with the tiniest figleaf, giving barely plausible deniability 
to the dehumanizing claims: “One of them was involved in an incident that has 
not been discussed in Catalonia…” By saying ‘one of them’, Torra can allege 
that he only meant people like that ‘catalanophobic’ person27. This works like 
23  https://twitter.com/sempresaludava/status/1103615037812457474
24  Misogynistic attacks against Arrimadas have been common (see García 2019).
25  https://elpais.com/ccaa/2017/11/17/catalunya/1510905240_893566.html
26  https://www.elnacional.cat/es/politica/ingeniosa-accion-vecinos-amer-visita-cs_355857_102.
html
27  The explicit target of the article had his flat broken into and vandalized after the article was 
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Trump’s ‘and some of them, I assume, are good people’. The phrase gives Torra 
enough ambiguity as to what was meant: the dehumanization of all Spaniards 
in Catalonia, or only those that are like this one person. 
Torra also wrote indirectly harmful articles, for instance using code words 
like “April Fair”:
Catalanism must be based on a bloody defense of our identity and our culture, 
our language and our dignity, the desire to build a cosmopolitan and cultured 
country, with the courage and pride of being Catalan. Or do you want to allow 
an independent Catalonia to be turned into an immense April Fair? (Torra 2012)
April Fairs are popular Spring festivals celebrated in Andalusia. 
Torra’s quote is structurally analogous to Trump’s “inner-city wreck”. Torra 
could plausibly say, “I wasn’t attacking anyone, I’m just defending Catalan 
traditions!” Yet, assuming the conversational maxim of relevance, we can ask: 
what is the relevance of bringing up an Andalusian festival in the context of 
defending Catalan traditions? Mentioning it under the construction ‘or would 
you rather…’ invites an association between the defense of Catalan identity, and 
the rejection of the presence of Andalusians and their traditions in Catalonia. 
Now, explicitly asserting this would trigger self-monitoring, since it would 
explicitly deny that people of Andalusian ancestry have a right to cultural and 
political expression in Catalonia. But using the code word does not explicitly 
deny Andalusians these rights. It thus allows xenophobic resentment to go 
unchecked, while protecting the audience’s positive self-conception as fair and 
democratic. This illustrates how code words contribute to undermine rational 
democratic deliberation.
3.2.2 Guilt attribution
Guilt attribution for e.g. rape or murder, current difficulties, the destruction 
of the economy, occupation, oppression, etc., presents an out-group as the 
morally deserving target of resentment and retributive action (Maynard & 
Benesch 2016: 81). This is illustrated in statements by political leaders: Pujol’s 
description of Spanish migrants as an occupation army, Torra’s description of 
Spain as “an exporter of poverty, materially and spiritually speaking” (Torra 
2010), or the common propaganda slogans “Madrid robs us” and “Spain does 
not respect us”. Even writers who proclaim a rejection of xenophobia fall back 
on contrasting Catalan superiority and victimhood, against Spanish guilt and 
inferiority, recovering the trope of the beast of the Franco regime:
published, events he correlates (Iglesias 2018).
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Although the emotional disconnection experienced by many Catalans is due 
to the catalanophobia of some and the complicit silence of others, there are 
deeper processes that explain a progressive distancing between Spain and 
Catalonia. We speak, for example, of a divergent political culture: one based on 
the survival of the Franco regime in its strategic institutions, while the other on 
militant anti-fascism, which explains, to give an example, a system of parties 
more in keeping with continental logic than with the Iberian. We also speak 
of an identity, the Castilian Spanish identity, rocky, unalterable, exclusive, 
not permeable to plurality and intolerant of dissent, and another, the Catalan, 
dynamic, heterogeneous, mutant, which, in order to survive, reinvents itself at 
each generation. (Díez 2019) (my emphasis)
The dichotomy Xavier Díez lays down is based on the essentialization of 
features presumed to constitute two incompatible national identities. But Díez 
overlooks the reality of democratic progress across Spain, and undemocratic 
resistance to such progress in all regions, Catalonia included, which are evident 
in abuses of power, corruption cases, and authoritarian tendencies reported 
in many of the articles surveyed in the preparation of this paper. It is worth 
registering that the historian Roger Molinas (2018) draws attention to the 
fact that CiU, a coalition that included Pujol’s party CDC, absorbed the most 
politicians from the Franco dictatorship, particularly Catalan mayors. There 
were three times more Francoist mayors transitioning to CiU in 1979 than to all 
other parties together (see also Marcet 1984, and Antich 1988).
3.2.3 Threat construction
The third feature of the content of DS is threat construction, where an 
out-group is accused of planning violent attacks against the in-group. This 
happened in Rwanda, through “accusations in a mirror” (Marcus 2016), a 
technique for inciting violence that accuses the intended victims of the crimes 
that are planned against them. Other techniques deploy familiar tropes, e.g. 
“they’re coming for our women!” deployed often in representations of Muslim 
men (Sherwood 2016).
In an issue of Catalan International View, Marta Jorba refers to people 
who defend the Spanish rule of law as accomplices of sexism, racism, and 
sexual assault, presumed essential features of Spanish identity, while raising 
the trope of the Francoist threat:
The Spanish state has let its mask slip, revealing the inheritance of a beast 
[Francoism] that now sees the chance to reemerge… Unionists that tolerate 
and whitewash the unpunished presence of the fascist far-right on the streets. A 
presence accompanied by high levels of testosterone directed at flagrant sexism 
and racism, that celebrates disharmony and humiliation. Taking the occasion, 
once again, to assault women whenever they have an opportunity. A state of 
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emergency that is the normal state of affairs in a country of dubious democratic 
quality. (Jorba 2018: 46-47) (My emphasis)
The truth of the claims is taken for granted without providing supporting 
evidence of the alleged increase in sexual violence. This has an intended effect 
– to silence opponents of secession from expressing their equally legitimate 
political opinions. In fact, the opposite of what she says (and of what Díez 
alleged) is true, as others have argued: 
Spain has been declared the best country in the world to be born, the most 
sociable to live, the safest to travel alone without danger throughout its territory. 
According to The Economist, its democratic quality is well above Belgium, 
France and Italy. Spain is a world leader in organ donation and transplants, 
in assisted fertilization, in early cancer detection systems, in free universal 
healthcare, in life expectancy only behind Japan… in editorial production, in 
maritime conservation, in water treatment, in clean energies… in construction 
of large high-speed railway infrastructures…  Spain is the country with the 
lowest incidence of gender violence in Europe, far behind socially envied 
Finland, France, Denmark or Sweden; the third with the least killings per 100 
000 inhabitants, and together with Italy, it has the lowest suicide rate. (Vicent 
2018)
More worrying, given the high-profile of the speaker, were Marta Rovira’s 
(from ERC) comments after the referendum in 2017:
… the Government [of Catalonia] was not willing to accept a scenario of 
extreme violence with dead people on the street. They [the Spanish government] 
told us that there would be blood and that we had to stop because they were very 
prepared, that they would not hesitate and that this time they would not use 
rubber bullets...28 (my emphasis)
She concluded with the recurrent trope: “now that the independence 
movement is the majority, the beast of Franco has emerged again.” In the 
meanwhile, official intermediaries between the central government and the 
Generalitat denied that there were any threats of violence (Ubarretxena 2017).
During the on-going trial of the secessionist politicians in 2019, former 
leaders of the Catalan police (Mossos d’Esquadra) testified that they had warned 
Puidgemont, Junqueras, and Joaquim Forn (then minister responsible for the 
police) of the risks of violence on the referendum day, and recommended that 
the Generalitat suspended it, since all police forces had orders from the Catalan 
Supreme Court to apprehend the ballot boxes and stop the voting. Puidgemont 
replied that if the anticipated violence occurred, he would declare independence 
28  https://www.rac1.cat/programes/el-mon/20171117/432938124502/lentrevista-a-marta-rovira-
minut-a-minut.html
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(Solé Altamira 2019). There are further indications that violence was not only 
expected but desired. Former communications director of the Generalitat, 
Josep Martí wrote in a recent monograph: “It was known that there would be 
charges on 1-O day and some Sovereignists29 not only took it for granted but 
also desired it”, and concluded the book saying that the secessionist process 
was a “power struggle” and not a movement driven by the people (Martí 2019). 
Searches conducted by the national police and national guard found that the 
former Catalan finance secretary, Lluis Salvadó, had tried to destroy files that 
laid down plans for guerrilla or war scenarios after the referendum (Charte & 
Gutierrez 2019).
Primary schools served as polling places on October 1st (a Sunday) and 
had been occupied on Friday 29th September, when the Catalan government 
suspended school directors to shield them from criminal charges. The Òmnium 
and ANC associations rallied people to “defend the voting points”, which 
were occupied with “permanent activities” (pajama parties, games, live music, 
films) from Friday evening until Sunday at dawn. Whole families participated: 
children, parents, and grandparents. In hindsight, the irresponsibility of the 
Catalan leaders can be properly appreciated – vulnerable people (children, 
elderly voters) were used as means to obstruct justice, with the expectation 
(and possible desire) that there would indeed be violent confrontations. (The 
events of the voting day are described in Morel 2018: ch. 20). It is arguable that 
the only reason there wasn’t more violence was Mariano Rajoy’s (then Spanish 
president) unresponsive disposition.
3.2.4 Destruction of alternatives
According to Maynard and Benesch, the fourth feature of DS is the 
destruction of alternatives, which represents the proposed course of action as 
a historical necessity, or alternatives as impractical. In a 2011 interview, Torra 
said: “We have no allies; the effort will be monstrous. If Spain… sends the 
tanks against us, we will have a great victory. I hope they send them, so that 
we can win some kind of sympathy”30. Torra statements implicate a desire that 
the central government would, indeed, take violent action against secessionists. 
In this article he reduces alternatives for what he presents as the survival 
of Catalans as a people:
29  The Spanish constitution declares that the Spanish people are sovereign. In Catalonia, 
secessionists use ‘sovereignty’ and ‘sovereignists’ to refer to themselves. An editorial of El 
País fact-checked Puidgemont’s claims in this regard: https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/20/
inenglish/1505917320_788824.html
30  https://www.racocatala.cat/forums/fil/150628/quim-torra-tant-bo-espanya-ens-envii-
tancs?pag=0
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There is no longer “right-wing Catalanism” or “left-wing Catalanism”… 
neither “liberalism” or “social democracy… today the battle is “unionism” or 
“independentism”, Spain or Catalonia, province or State. When the country 
lives a moment of national urgency, when there is a risk that the nation will 
dissolve like sugar in a glass of milk, when all the alarms are ringing at the same 
time for our survival as a people, the ideological discussion can’t be the axis 
that separates us… (Torra 2009)
3.2.5. Virtue-talk
The fifth feature of the content of DS is Virtue-talk, where the audience 
is motivated by deep and unreflected feelings that something feels “good” or 
“bad” inducing positive moral self-appraisal, a “satisfactory mental image of 
themselves... often shaped by notions of ideal group-identities, that produces 
considerable self-esteem” (Maynard & Benesch 2016: p. 84) A positive self-
appraisal is expressed when Mas speaks of “a connection with the best European 
traditions” and a Germanic “umbilical cord”, when Junqueras or Torra talk of 
a Catalan DNA, Maragall claims that “we’re more European”, or Cabré that 
“we’re better”. On a demonstration for the release of the people jailed while 
awaiting trial in 2017, a man who dropped the Catalan independence flag 
nervously said: “If I lose my identity, I die” (García & Congostrina 2017).
3.2.6 Future bias
The final feature of DS is Future-bias, presumed to outweigh the short-
term difficulties, or the moral costs of violence:
But the anticipated benefits can also be extravagant and utopian—promises that 
a positive transformation of society will be brought about through a temporary 
violent transition, or that national unity and prosperity for a long-mistreated 
people can be obtained. In light of the expectation that Soviet violence would 
protect the revolution and usher in Communist utopia, Lenin assured his 
followers that in the future “the cruelty of our lives, imposed by circumstance, 
will be understood and pardoned. Everything will be understood, everything.” 
… The novelist Boris Pasternak wrote in a letter in 1935: “The fact is, the longer 
I live the more firmly I believe in what is being done, despite everything. Much 
of it strikes one as being savage [yet] the people have never before looked so 
far ahead, and with such a sense of self-esteem, and with such fine motives, and 
for such vital and clear-headed reasons”. (Maynard & Benesch, 2016: 85-86)
Agustín Colomines, historian at the University of Barcelona, nicely 
exemplifies future-bias:
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Hey, didn’t everyone say that in the big rallies people held hands without 
asking who they were voting for?... [W]hen people called “Our President, 
Puigdemont”, they were calling for unity and resistance. Sovereignty will 
only win this combat when it gives shape to a flexible political movement of 
ordinary people, not of party militants... We must fight for independence and 
never forget the day we tried to vote and police violence prevented it. Only if 
the civil society decides to show up to vote, with or without the agreement of 
the traditional parties, will Sovereignty make the State and the unionists piss 
blood. (Colomines 2018) (My emphasis).
Colomines advocates for a unitarian movement that goes beyond political 
parties, supporting political sovereignty only for secessionists, and presenting 
violence and suffering as desirable.
Meaning perversions were particularly useful in the propaganda that 
promoted the alleged benefits of the referendum. In Mas’s campaign of 2012, 
he used the slogan “the will of the people”. In this context, the phrase makes 
a conversational implicature. First, the demagogue claims to represent the will 
of the people. But a large majority is not represented, a fact we know from 
context. Puidgemont claimed that his voter base (under 50% of population) 
gave him a popular mandate to approve the illegal acts of September 2017. 
But secessionism never had majority support in Catalonia. In the slogan, ‘the 
people’ excludes most of the people. 
The slogan as used then implicates that the large majority that is excluded 
does not have a right to political representation, because they are not the people, 
and that only those referred to have a right to make decisions concerning the 
future of the region. There are two levels of meaning perversion in the slogan. 
First, democracies are presumed to represent the will of each person who has 
the right to political representation. A collective in itself – the people – doesn’t 
have a will. Second, and more importantly, ‘people’ is presumed to refer to 
all citizens. But ‘people’ is not used descriptively to talk about the Catalan 
voting population, not even of a large majority of Catalans. As if to confirm 
this perversion, current president Torra has tried to silence accusations that he 
is not doing enough for the Catalan republic by claiming “I am the people”.31 
Stanley (2015) defines propaganda as the mechanism that frames “the 
debate in such a way as to exclude the perspective of a targeted group”, while 
creating “flawed ideological beliefs to the effect that the perspectives of a 
designated group are not worthy of reasonable consideration”. Propaganda 
in Catalonia has made use of numerous meaning perversions. The meaning 
perversion in the phrase “the will of the people” is an instance of propaganda 
as defined.  There are other perversions in campaign slogans, such as “we vote 
to be free!”, or “Democracy!” “We vote to be free!” perverts the meaning of 
31  https://elpais.com/ccaa/2019/03/23/catalunya/1553328538_236007.html
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“freedom”. Spanish citizens in Catalonia enjoy all the freedoms that Spanish 
citizens enjoy elsewhere in the country, and enjoy essentially the same rights as 
other European citizens. The construction “we vote to be free” implicates that if 
we don’t vote, we are not free. Given the Constitutional Court and governmental 
opposition to the referendum, the slogan served a part in the argument that 
opposition to the referendum is opposition to the freedom of Catalans. The 
slogan was presented as a defense of democratic freedoms, perverting the 
meaning of “freedom” since it was used in a context that violated the rights 
and freedoms of the majority. Another slogan was the simple “Democracy!” 
Torra regularly repeats that democracy is above the rule of law.32 The meaning 
perversion here is that outside of the rule of law there are two possibilities: 
autocracy or the state of nature. 
These three cases are meaning perversions. They use words with strong 
positive evaluative connotations that are part of shared social norms and 
values. Freedom and democracy, for the people, are all desirable in themselves. 
However, the slogans are used to refer to things that restrict or violate freedoms, 
are undemocratic, and deny political representation to a large part of the 
population. In so doing, they undermine and erode the norms that underlie the 
rule of law and protection of democratic values.
How does one resist these slogans? Any direct criticism invites rhetorical 
questions like “how can you be against democracy?”, “How can you be 
against my freedom?” “How can you be against the people?” An interlocutor 
is left speechless, since the reply to these questions should be obviously, and 
repeatedly, “no! I’m not against any of that”. The questions, and the slogans, are 
effective because they undermine norm-enforcements: they seem to reinforce 
shared democratic norms, whereas in fact they erode liberal democracy itself. 
Meaning perversions play a powerful role in future-bias arguments. They 
make it hard to resist propaganda that uses them. Together with code words and 
figleaves, they convey harmful content indirectly. It is easier to accept what they 
communicate indirectly than it would be if what they proposed were explicitly 
asserted. Their indirectness allows an audience to avoid the psychological 
tension they would otherwise feel between the explicit profession of liberal 
democratic ideals, and the endorsement of parochial or partisan motivating 
attitudes. This is an obstacle to the resolution to any political situation, since 
rational political deliberation requires identifying and stating explicitly the 
policies under consideration.
32  https://www.ondacero.es/programas/mas-de-uno/videos/quim-torra-democracia-primero-antes-
que-ley_201902135c63dc710cf2cb42a35882af.html
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4 Closing comments
In this paper, I’ve done three distinct things. I started with a brief 
introduction to the notion of dangerous speech and ideology, as characterized 
by Susan Benesch and Jonathan Maynard (2016). The importance of the notion 
is displayed in the correlation between the set of identifying characteristics 
and historical acts of mass violence. But I was interested here in doing two 
additional things, which I believe are both interesting in themselves and 
important. One was to offer a framework for integrating various philosophical 
theories in an explanation of how dangerous speech and ideology harms. The 
second section of the paper integrated aspects of philosophy of language and 
of philosophy of action to offer such a framework. In 2012, Benesch had 
made a distinction between directly and indirectly harmful speech. This is a 
distinction that can be typified in philosophy of language as one between (i) 
speech that is constitutively harmful, because of its illocutionary force, and (ii) 
speech that is harmful because of its perlocutionary effects. I offered examples 
of the two kinds, with derogatory and denigrating language as directly harmful 
discourse, and a set of indirectly harmful forms of discourse, including code 
words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. This section then gave a possible 
explanation of the motivational force of harmful speech, and of the moral 
responsibility of the audiences who accommodate it.
The second thing I did in the paper was to use reports in the media about the 
secessionist efforts in Catalonia, and quotes from Catalan leaders, as a case study 
of dangerous speech, one that has not so far led to mass violence (and which, 
obviously, I hope will never do). The exercise of illustrating how demagogic 
discourse in Catalonia, from presidents of the Generalitat to political pundits 
from the various quadrants of Catalan nationalism, is important because it is 
revealing of a common ground of victimism, resentment, recurrent derogation 
of Spain and/or Spaniards, and of ill-resolved past conflicts, which are often 
used for political gain. Catalan authorities have exploited local media to offer a 
coherent view of reality consistent with the secessionist ideology (as admitted 
by some of those responsible for Catalan TV, for instance), have attributed 
guilt for occupation, colonization, for deprivation of wealth, have constructed 
an existential threat (from sexism and violence, to dangers of annihilation of 
one’s cultural identity, or actual military violence), tried to reduce alternatives, 
constructed a positive self-image as just better, or more European and civilized 
– a self-image that has a hint of racism, since it is construed in opposition to the 
other that is uncultured, uncivilized, un-European, reminding of an unfortunate 
common saying, “south of the river Ebro, all moors” – and promoted future-
bias. The examples reviewed illustrate also how directly and indirectly harmful 
forms of speech have been present, as the existence of specific slurs for 
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Catalans with origins from non-Catalan regions and for Catalans who oppose 
secession illustrates, as well as several of the past writings of the president of 
the Generalitat, Quim Torra, and his ease at contrasting the desirable North and 
the undesirable South: “here there are people who have said enough and… fight 
for their ideas and their country. People are no longer looking to the South and 
look to the North again, where people are clean, noble, free and cultured. And 
happy.” (Torra 2008b)
Why is this important and interesting? I started with a caveat explaining 
what I did not want to do here. I did not want to point at the obvious – that 
there are risks to democracy arising from the far-right. This is true across 
Europe, and many commentators and theorists are doing the important work 
of signaling it (e.g., Stanley 2018). I wanted to do what is not obvious, and 
use theoretical resources to point to the naturalness with which demonstrably 
harmful speech is accepted and taken for granted as normal in Catalonia, and 
the responsibility shared by a large minority of the Catalan population that 
accepted, in 2017, to take part in actions that could foreseeably have led to 
violent confrontations, and to involve their vulnerable family members (e.g., 
their children) in that action. The responsibility is shared even by those who 
so participated while disavowing of any possibility of violent confrontation, 
and believing to be merely expressing their desires. Catalan police officers 
and Catalan government officials foresaw that possibility and discussed it, and 
government leaders nonetheless chose to put into motion a series of acts that 
not only defied the Constitution, the Catalan Supreme Court, lacked majority 
support, and, worst of all, which they knew would put their own supporters in 
harm’s way.
Do I believe there is a real risk of serious violence in Catalonia? I think that 
the socioeconomic status of most supporters of secession suggests that many 
will not risk losing their privileges. They may still harbor a sense of aggrieved 
entitlement, resentment, and contempt. The real risks of violent behavior arise 
among smaller, and younger, activist groups that have been engaged in acts 
of vandalism, some threats of violence, condoned by secessionist politicians 
(Baquero 2018). And depending on the result of the April 2019 elections, on the 
threat posed by the far-right.
A suggestion for parties that defend the rule of law is this: do not make 
concessions that compromise the truth, or the defense of equal rights and duties 
for all citizens in Catalonia, and the rest of Spain. Those concessions will be 
exploited to animate further resentment, and to fuel extremism, as the recent 
rise of the far-right testifies. The past history of division and violence in Spain 
should serve as a warning and a deterrent, not a motivator. 
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